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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, American workers have long depended on personal savings,
pension plans and Social Security for an economically sound retirement. 1
Historically, these types of savings and pensions were expected to prevent poverty
during retirement. 2 Unfortunately today and in the future, most people during
retirement will have little personal savings, will not receive the expected pensions,
and will have a small chance of receiving a sufficient amount from Social Security.3
Among the many relative factors affecting pensions, the acceleration of failure
among American businesses has raised concerns among employees and retirees of a
stable financial future. 4 Recent business failures 5 have caused thousands of
employees to lose jobs and millions of employees and retirees to lose financial
resources for retirement.6 Across the nation, pension plans have been left unfunded
or underfunded by failed companies. 7 With millions of people approaching
retirement, Congress is focusing on protecting their financial future.8

1

See RALPH NADER & KATE BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 1-2 (1973). Social
Security was never intended to be used as the only source of retirement income. See id. at 13.
Today, however, both pension plans and Social Security have proven to be inadequate to
provide financial stability during retirement. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Many
Companies Fight Shortfalls in Pension Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at A1; Mary
Williams Walsh, $8 Billion Surplus Withers at Agency Insuring Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2003, at A1; Robert Perez and Susan Malley, Asset Allocation and the Social Security
System, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1983, Vol.12, Issue 1, at 29. Millions of people have relied on
pension funds as an insured income for retirement, yet many have failed to receive any amount
of promised pension funds. See, e.g., id.
2

See generally NADER & BLACKWELL, supra note 1.

3

Id. at 1-5.

4
See CORPORATE FINANCIAL SCANDALS INSPIRE NEW PROPOSAL
BANKR. INST. J. LEXIS 127, at *1-2 (2002).

IN

CONGRESS, 2002

AM.

5

See id. at *1. Business failures range from bankruptcy to corporate fraud. See id.; see
also Connelly, infra note 232.
6
William McQuillen, Enron Ex-CFO Andrew Fastow is Indicted in Fraud Case,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 31, 2002. Enron’s collapse alone led to 5,500 workers losing their
jobs, severance pay and insurance. Id. In 1992, the risk of losing future retirement benefits
was enormous as the estimated deficit of underfunded pension plans was $18 billion by the
end of 1997. U.S. Pension Threat Continues to Grow, NEWSDAY, Nov. 20, 1992, at 44.
7

See George F. Will, Steel and the National Security, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A33
(“[T]he suffering of 600,000 retired steelworkers—30 times more numerous than Enron
employees—whose retirement benefits could become nothing but billions of dollars of
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Retirement income for employees and beneficiaries is funded through three main
retirement programs: Social Security, individual savings accounts, and pensions. 9
Impacts on the economy, such as September 11th, WorldCom and Enron, have
stagnated the economy, directly affecting every type of retirement savings.10 As a
result, Social Security funds continue to dwindle, leaving today’s younger generation
with uncertainty of receiving government assistance during retirement.11 The stock
market's recent continuous decline has resulted in lower interest rates, giving people
less of an incentive to save and invest.12 Particularly exacerbating this issue are the
business failures that are leaving promised pension funds unfunded or underfunded.13
In an effort to combat issues such as these, Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) to address economic downfalls
and to provide rules and regulations for employer pension plans.14 Thereafter, ERISA
created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) with the goal of
unfunded liabilities of bankrupt corporations”); see also Mary Williams Walsh, New Rules
Urged to Avert Looming Pension Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, at A1.
8
See Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (2001),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2001/di_asr01.pdf (last visited
March 3, 2004). At year end of 2000, there were 28.5 million retired workers. Id. See also
Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (2000),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2000/di_asr00.pdf. (last visited
March 3, 2004). At year end of 1999, there were 27.8 million retired workers. Id.
9
See Defusing the Retirement Time Bomb: Encouraging Pension Savings, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & the
Workforce, 105th Cong. (1997).
10

See generally U.S. Representative Jim Saxton (R-NJ) Holds Hearing on the Economic
Report of the President: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 107th Cong. (2002). In
the Congressional hearing, Rep. Saxton addressed the economic downfall and discussed ways
that may improve pension security. Among these methods are financial disclosures and
information. Id.
11
Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the Costs
and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 544 (2001); see also Mary Williams Walsh, Shifting
Responsibility for Funding Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at C1.
12
See, e.g., Symposium, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation
Plans, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 488-96 (2002).
13

See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Turmoil at WorldCom: Retirement Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2002, at C1.
14

Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
[E]mployee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the
operational scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that
the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest. . . . Despite the enormous growth in (benefit) plans, many employees with
long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack
of vesting provisions in such plans . . . employees and their beneficiaries have been
deprived of anticipated benefits.
§ 1001.
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protecting employee pension plans through insuring the defined benefit pensions
given by employers.15 However, the recent downfalls of the economy post-9/11 have
left the PBGC to bear the burden of insuring billions of dollars of unfunded and
underfunded pensions, 16 resulting in deficits totaling $2.123 billion in 2001. 17
Unfortunately, this deficit is only expected to get larger,18 complicating the PBGC’s
ability to insure retirement funds.
While historically pension plans have been an important source of retirement
income for retirees,19 the post-9/11 state of the economy is forcing Congress to focus
on the future of the PBGC’s ability to insure these pension funds.20 Since the PBGC
is financially dependent or directly affected by the companies in the economy,21 it is
paramount that Congress take action to secure the future of the PBGC in order to
protect and preserve the retirement benefits of employees.
To protect the financial future of retirees, this Note advocates that Congress pass
legislation mandating a certain percentage of retirement plan funds be allocated into
a low-risk individual retirement account (“IRA”) insured by the Federal Depository
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). This plan will shift the massive financial burden
off of the PBGC. Section II of this Note provides an overview of pension plans and
the PBGC with reference to economic and demographic factors that affect pensions.
Thereafter, Section III discusses the current economic circumstances and their affect
on retirement savings and the future of the PBGC.22 Section IV analyzes pending
federal legislation that attempts to solve the problems of unfunded and underfunded
pension plans. This section also outlines alternative solutions proposed by legal
scholars and the various flaws in those plans. Finally, section V details this Note's
proposed solution of a statutory mandate to invest a certain percentage of retirement
15

29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311, 1321-1323, 1341-1350, 1361-1368 (2004).

16

See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 2001 Annual Report (2001) [hereinafter
PBGC], available at http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/01annrpt.pdf (last visited Jan.
30, 2003).
17

Id. at 25.

18

Mary Williams Walsh, $8 Billion Surplus Withers at Agency Insuring Pensions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, at A1. At the end of the month of January 2003, the PBGC is expected
to bear a deficit between $1 billion to $2 billion. Id. Additionally, more and more companies
are declaring bankruptcy with insufficient funds to cover their present and future retirees'
pensions. See id.; see also David Cay Johnston, At the Pension Agency, A Much Healthier
Glow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, at 10; PBGC, supra note 16.
19
Michael J. Collins, Reviving Defined Benefit Plans: Analysis and Suggestions for
Reform, 20 VA. TAX REV. 599, 601-10, 656 (2001). Pension income serves as the “secondlargest source of income” in the United States. Walsh, supra note 18, at A1.
20
See Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002); Protecting America’s
Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002). Both acts are currently pending in
Congress and may affect the future of pension plans. See also Walsh, supra note 18, at A1.
21

Financial security. Keep Tabs on Your Pension, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2002, Vol. 67,
No. 10, at 10-11. “[I]f the employer goes under or can’t continue the plan, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) . . . will step in and pay beneficiaries instead.” Id.
22

Johnston, supra note 18, at 10. In 2000, the PBGC had a surplus of almost $10 billion.

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

5

158

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:153

funds into a low-risk IRA that is insured by the FDIC. In conjunction with this
proposal, this Note addresses certain pension management factors such as
diversification in plan assets 23 and improving information disclosures to plan
participants. 24 By implementing this proposal, Congress, through legislation, can
protect the future of the PBGC and the future of pensions.
II. OVERVIEW OF PENSION PLANS AND THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION
A. History
The pension movement began during the late 19th century.25 While the movement
began to grow rapidly during the Industrial Revolution, it slowed throughout the
Great Depression.26 Initially, pensions served as part of the corporate strategy to lure
more employees to work for corporations instead of the common family business.27
After the Depression, the pension movement continued to grow as the senior
population of people 65 years of age and over grew, along with low birthrates, high
life expectancy, and an increase in the work force. 28 As a result of this growth,
private pensions became the largest owner of corporate stock. 29 The unexpected
popularity of pensions assisted in establishing a country of “big business, big labor
and big government.”30
The Social Security Act of 1935 started the government’s involvement in
retirement plans. This Act was intended to provide government assistance in
retirement.31 The Depression in the 1930s had created severe unemployment, which
had altered pension policy32 and influenced Congress to pass legislation that would
provide retirement benefits to American workers. While Social Security has provided
the foundation of our country's retirement income system, it is facing a solvency
crisis.33 Although there have been many ideas of how to increase pension coverage to

23

Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. (2002).

24

Protecting America’s Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002).

25

See DAN M. MCGILL, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 1 (7th ed. 1996).

26

Id.

27

See STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 1-2 (1997).

28

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 1-5.

29

SASS, supra note 27, at 1.

30

Id. at 3.

31

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 9.

32
ELIZABETH L. MEIER & CYNTHIA C. DITTMAR, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PENSION POLICY,
VARIETIES OF RETIREMENT AGES iii (1980).
33

United States General Accounting Office, Social Security: Criteria for Evaluating Social
Security
Reform
Proposals
(Mar.
25,
1999),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99094t.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2003); see also Moore,
supra note 11, at 544.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss2/3

6

2004]

THE FUTURE OF AMERICANS’ PENSIONS

159

supplement Social Security through a Minimal Universal Pension System, 34 a
required individual savings account,35 and mandatory employer- funded individual
separate plans, none of these ideas have worked independently of the other. Thus,
Social Security continues to be of great concern to the American population in that
the depletion of funds may result in inadequate payments to retirees and
beneficiaries.36
In 1974 Congress enacted ERISA, 37 one of the most ambitious and extensive
efforts to provide pension benefit security for employees and their beneficiaries.38
Specifically, ERISA provides employees and dependents payment security in their
benefit plans39 by addressing their shortcomings: a lack of disclosure to participants,
loss of benefits, inadequate funding, plan terminations and fiduciary misconduct.40
ERISA serves these goals by imposing reporting and disclosure requirements, as
well as minimum participation, vesting and funding standards on the employer. 41
34

PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL
RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 42 (1981). The presidential committee proposed a Minimum
Universal Pension System (MUPS) to be a mandatory minimum pension plan provided by
employers to their employees. This plan recommended that the employer contribute three
percent of payroll contribution. Id.
35

David A. Pratt, Nor Rhyme Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans, 49
BUFFALO L. REV. 741, 749 (2001). The proposal by President Clinton to supplement Social
Security included individual savings accounts and a mandatory matching of funds by the
federal government. Id.
36

MEIER & DITTMAR, supra note 32, at iii; see also United States General Accounting
Office, Social Security: Criteria for Evaluating Social Security Reform Proposals (Mar. 25,
1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99094t.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2003);
Appendix C: Gains and Losses from Social Security, Average Pension Accrual Gains, and Net
Gains and Losses Combined. Social Security investments render an increased loss of pension
gains with a higher income and larger length of employment. Appendix C.
37

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
is a massive piece of legislation. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the United States Code). ERISA
originated in 1962 when President John F. Kennedy put together a special task-force to
evaluate private retirement programs impact on the nation’s economy. See 120 Con. Rec. §
15, 743 (1974) (Statement of Sen. Javits). On September 2, 1974, President Ford signed
ERISA into law. Id.
38

See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2002); see also SASS, supra note 27, at 3.

39

§ 1001(a).

40

Id.

41

Id. Before ERISA in 1974, pension plans were considered to be non-gratuitous
contracts. See, e.g., Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that
retirees have a contractual right to their pensions and an employer must pay these pensions
regardless of the employer’s financial difficulties).
The pension plan provided that all employees of the defendant, if they remained in the
employ of the defendant ten or more years would be entitled, on attaining retirement
age, to certain specified pension rights. While unilateral, that offer, when accepted by
an employee as evidenced by rendering services for ten or more years, became
‘irrevocable’ and such employee acquired ‘a right no less contractual than if the plan
were expressly bargained for.' By rendering service for the period required under the
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While ERISA monitors pension plans that are established by an employer to provide
retirement income to employees,42 it excludes coverage to government plans that are
established or maintained for government employees, 43 plans governed by the
Railroad Retirement Act,44 plans that deal with an international organizations,45 and
plans maintained for the purpose of complying with applicable unemployment
compensation, workmen's compensation, or disability insurance laws.46 However, the
tide has shifted with regard to pension plans. Once considered a gratuitous
contribution by the employer in recognition of faithful service,47 pension plans are
now considered by the courts as a binding obligation by the employer to the
employee.48
With the growing concern of ensuring and insuring pension plan funds, ERISA
legislation created the PBGC.49 The PBGC is a nonprofit corporation, wholly owned
plan, the employee's rights to the benefits under the plan are ‘earned no less than the
salary paid to him (the employee) each pay period' and are ‘in the nature of delayed
compensation for former years of faithful service.’ Whether the plan be contributory
or noncontributory, the benefits, thus earned, are not gratuities.
Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1971); accord Hardy v. H.
K. Porter, Inc., 562 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1977); Schofield v. Zion's Co-Operative Mercantile Inst.,
39 P.2d 342 (Utah 1934).
[E]ven though the employer has reserved the right to amend or terminate the plan,
once an employee, who has accepted employment under such plan, has complied with
all the conditions entitling him to participate in such plan, his rights become vested
and the employer cannot divest the employee of his rights thereunder.
Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E.2d 518, 522 (Ohio 1960).
42

Donna Litman, Bankruptcy Status of “ERISA Qualified Pension Plans”—An Epilogue to
Patterson v. Shumate, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 637, 661 (2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
1002(2)(A) which states:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that by its express terms or as a result surrounding circumstances such plan, fund or
program: (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of
income by employees for periods extending to termination of covered employment or
beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits
from the plan.
§ 1002(a).
43

29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1) (2002).

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

§ 1003(b)(3).

47

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 20.

48

See Hoefel, 581 F.2d at 10 (citing Balkin v. Frank M. Katz, Inc., 367 N.E.2d 628, 630
(1977)). A pension plan will be binding on an employer if the employee rendered service in
reliance on the employer's promise. Id.
49
29 U.S.C. § 1305 (2002). “PBGC insures pension benefits of a corporation’s employees
if a company sponsoring an underfunded defined benefit pension plan becomes insolvent.
PBGC becomes trustee of the plan and its assets, and is then responsible for investing those
assets and paying benefits to the plan’s participants.” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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by the United States Government.50 It is operated by a board of directors that consists
of the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury and the Commerce.51 Its primary purpose is to
encourage private pension plans, to provide payment of pension benefits, and to
maintain reasonable premiums.52 However, the PBGC’s large deficit is impeding its
ability to protect and encourage pensions.
B. Economic and Demographic Factors of Pension Plans
For the past few decades, this nation has experienced an inflationary economy.53
With the value of the dollar decreasing54 and cost of living increasing,55 a pension
plan may be insufficient for a retiree to have a comfortable retirement. 56
Additionally, factors such as life expectancy, retirement age, labor market demand,
plan complexity and tax treatment affect employers’ ability to establish and maintain
pension plans. While some of these factors may deter employers from establishing
private pensions, others may benefit the employer. These economic and demographic
factors that impact pension plans are discussed in more detail below.
Investment Policy Statement, GAO/HEHS-99-37R, PBGC’s Financial Condition (Nov. 9,
1994).
50

29 U.S.C.. § 1302 (2002).

51

Id.
There is established within the Department of Labor a body corporate to be known as
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. In carrying out its functions under this
title, the corporation shall be administered by the chairman of the board of directors in
accordance with policies established by the board. The purposes of this subchapter,
which are to be carried out by the corporation, are—(1) to encourage the continuation
and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their
participants, (2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension
benefits to participants and beneficiaries under plans to which this title applies, and (3)
to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 4006 [29 U.S.C. §
1306] at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this title.

Id.
52

§ 1302(a)(1)-(3).

53

U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Annual
Percentage Changes from 1913 to Present (Feb. 21, 2003), available at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited March 15, 2004). The consumer
price index “produces monthly data on changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a
representative basket of goods and services.” U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Consumer Price Indexes, available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (last visited March
15, 2004). The CPI measures inflation and serves as an indicator to the measure government
policy efficiency. See id. Every year since 1955, the price index has increased. See id.
54
Christina Wise, Weak Economies Abroad Put Lid on Benefits of a Weaker Dollar,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Mar. 4, 2003, at A1.
55
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index: January
2003, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
The CPI level rose 2.6% since January 2002. Id.
56
See generally MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 1. Because a defined benefit pension
plan does not adjust to inflation, the set amount of a pension benefit will be worth less today in
an inflationary economy than it would twenty years ago when inflation was not as high. Id.
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1. Cost of Living
As cost-of-living expenses and medical costs increase, 57 the real value of a
pension plan will decrease. Most pension plans provide for a fixed amount or
percentage of benefits to be repaid at retirement.58 The increase of the Consumer
Price Index, accompanied by decrease in the value of the U.S. dollar, creates an
inflationary effect, which results in a decrease in the value of pension assets.59 This
inflationary result is damaging to private pension plans because they are not indexed
for inflation,60 which causes a loss of purchasing power.61 Exacerbating this issue is
the fact that adjustments for these cost-of-living increases also increase the cost of
Social Security and pension plans.62 Therefore, the continuation of an inflationary
economy is detrimental to employees and retirees who are relying on fixed pension
income.
2. Life Expectancy
Life expectancy is one of the many factors that can affect a person’s retirement.63
Improvements in medical science, public health services, and general living
standards increase one's life span.64 In 1995, life expectancy was estimated at 75
years versus 64 years in 1940.65 Increase in life expectancy will increase the amount
of time that an employer will have to pay pension benefits to retirees, resulting in an
increased cost to the employer.

57
See Social Security Association, Medicare: History of Provisions, Table 2.C1—
Medicare cost of sharing and premium amounts (1966-2001), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/Supplment/2001/2c1.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). This chart
demonstrates the increase of health care costs and premiums in the United States since 1966.
58

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 27.

59

See Wise, supra note 54, at A1. The current value of the U.S. dollar continues to
decrease. Id.; see also Appendix B: Relative Value of Money and Returns in a Normal
Savings Account Paying a Ten Percent Rate of Return with a Five Percent Inflation Rate and
Subject to a Twenty-five Percent Tax Rate. This chart illustrates that both real returns on
savings and purchasing power decreases with inflation. Appendix B.
60

MEIER & DITTMAR, supra note 32, at 79.

61

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 478; see also MCCONNELL & BRUE, infra note 274
and accompanying text.
62

MEIER & DITTMAR, supra note 32, at 79.

63

RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., TAX PLANNING AND PRACTICE GUIDE, PLANNING
FOR INDIVIDUALS NEARING RETIREMENT AGE 5 (1997). Life expectancy is calculated using
Internal Revenue Service tables. An employee, IRA owner and spouse may have their life
expectancy recalculated annually. Id.
64

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 3.

65

See generally William G. Shipman, The Cato Project on Social Security Privatization,
Retiring with Dignity: Social Security vs. Private Markets (Aug. 14, 1995), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/ssps/ssp2.html (last visited March 15, 2004).
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3. Retirement Age
To be eligible for benefits under a pension plan, many employers require that an
employee be at least 21 years old and be employed by that employer for a minimum
of one year.66 Traditionally, the normal retirement age is the “earliest age at which
eligible participants are permitted to retire with full benefits.”67 Currently, retirement
age is a factor in rising pension costs.68 Although the age of 65 remains the standard
retirement age, this age is expected to rise.69 If retirement age rises, employers will
be required to pay into pension plans longer. This result will potentially decrease the
use of private pension plans by employers due to the increased cost in maintaining
pensions.
4. Labor Market
The size of the labor market can directly affect pension plans. The post-9/11 state
of the economy with inflation and corporate bankruptcies has increased
unemployment and has decreased the amount of people eligible for pensions. 70
However, as “baby boomers” retire, a large amount of people will leave the labor
market, creating an increased demand for labor that will, in turn, decrease the
unemployment rate. 71 This decrease in unemployment rates may increase the
financial burden on employers to provide more pensions, but the increase in
productivity due to an increase in employees may offset any financial burden.
5. Labor Costs
A lowered labor cost may be achieved through employers' use of pension plans.
Pension plans provide employees an incentive to stay with a company. 72 This
incentive benefits both the employee and the employer. By offering a pension plan
to decrease the mobility of the employer’s workers, the employer minimizes labor
costs.73 By retaining workers, employers save on training costs and provide more
66

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 62.; ERISA § 202(a)(1) (1978); I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)
(2003).
67

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 213. “ERISA defined normal retirement age
simply as the normal retirement age specified in the plan, but not later than age 65 with 10
years of participation.” Id. (quoting JOHN H. LONGBEIN & BRICE A. WALK, PENSION &
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 376 (2d ed. 1995)); see also ERISA § 3(24); I.R.C. § 411(a)(8)
(2003).
68

MEIER & DITTMAR, supra note 32, at iii.

69
See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 341. Retirement age is expected to increase to age
67 by the year 2022. Moore, supra note 11, at 545.
70

See generally Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-7. Selected Unemployment Indicators,
Seasonally Adjusted (2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t07.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2003). The unemployment rate was 5.6% in January 2002 and increased up to
6.0% in December 2002. Id. As of January 2003, the unemployment rate was 5.7%, which is
still higher than what it was a year prior. Id.
71

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 4-5.

72

See SASS, supra note 27, at 1.

73

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 445.
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productive workers.74 Therefore, the cost of providing pension plans may be viewed
as an investment on behalf of the employer.
6. Plan Complexity
The complex nature of federal pension laws discourages employers from
participating in such pension programs.75 Developments and changes among pension
plans have led to a voluminous amount of legislation that deters employers from
partaking in pension plans. 76 Furthermore, the long-term nature of pension plans
subjects employers to the constant burden of updating and familiarizing themselves
with an excessive amount of regulation and legislation.77 For instance, the PBGC
must submit annual reports to measure its success of insuring employees. 78 In
compiling this data, the administrators of pension plans and companies that sponsor
the plans have numerous reporting and administrative responsibilities. 79
Additionally, employers are required to keep basic records of employee information
including date of birth, date of employment, earnings, and contributions. 80 What
results is a complex bureaucracy of paperwork that deters employer participation.
Many scholars and legislators advocate a simpler method of establishing and
maintaining pensions. Some scholars have recommended uniform rules and a
decrease in the amount of plans available in an effort to simplify defined contribution
plans.81 In order to avoid the transformation of employers from defined benefit plans
to defined contribution plans there must be a reduction in regulation.

74

Id.

75

Overview of Present-Law Rules Relating to Qualified Pension Plans, (JCX-30-98),
Prepared by the Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n (May 4, 1998). The Joint Committee on
Taxation has commented on the need for pension simplification. Id.
76

See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX
REV. 607, 613-14 (2000).
77

Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U .L.Q. 311, 334 (1998).

78

29 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (2002).
Operation of corporation (a) Investigatory authority; audit of statistically significant
number of terminating plans. The corporation may make such investigations as it
deems necessary to enforce any provision of this subchapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder, and may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in writing,
under oath or otherwise as the corporation shall determine, as to all the facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The corporation shall
annually audit a statistically significant number of plans terminating under section
1341(b) of this title to determine whether participants and beneficiaries have received
their benefit commitments and whether section 1350(a) of this title has been satisfied.
Each audit shall include a statistically significant number of participants and
beneficiaries.
Id.
79

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Plan Administration (2001), available at
http://www.pbgc.gov/plan_admin/default.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
80

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 53.

81

Pratt, supra note 35, at 752.
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7. Tax Liability
Employers who participate in pension plans benefit from favorable tax treatment,
which as a result increases the adoption of such plans.82 The Internal Revenue Code
offers favorable tax treatment for employers who maintain “qualified” retirement
plans,83 as the employer can deduct contributions for income tax purposes.84 The
investment earnings or the contributions only become taxable upon actual payment
of the benefits to the plan participants.85 Additionally, a tax exemption is granted for
the trust that holds the plan assets.86 Tax-deferred accounts render a much lower tax
liability than does a normal savings account, which results in a higher after-tax
benefit.87 For example, an employer can deduct a maximum of 25 percent of covered
compensation if it covers the same group of employees in both qualified defined
benefit pension plans and qualified defined contribution plans.88 However, ERISA
will place an excise tax penalty on any “disqualified person” that engages in a
prohibited transaction.89
C. Types of Pension Plans
There are two types of pension plans: defined benefit plans 90 and defined
contribution plans.91

82
I.R.C. § 404(a) (2003). However, “no tax deduction for any year cannot exceed the
amount needed to bring the plan to a fully funded status. That is, no deductions can be taken
for contributions that would raise the plan assets to a level above the actuarial value of plan
liabilities.” MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 132.
83

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 115.

84

See I.R.C. § 404(a), supra note 82; MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 132.

85

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 136.

86

I.R.C. § 501(a) (2003).

87

See Appendix A: Alternative Taxes and Benefit Accumulations Under Normal Savings
and Tax Deferred Accounts at Twenty-five Percent Tax Rates (dollars). In comparing the
results of a normal savings account and a tax-deferred account, the overall tax liability is less
with a tax-deferred account. Id.
88

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 133 (citing I.R.C. § 404(a)(7)).

89

I.R.C. § 4975 (2003). For the purpose of the labor provisions, a disqualified person is
one who is equivalent to a party-in-interest. See id.
90

29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2002). Defined benefit plans are pensions derived from employer
contributions, other than an individual account plan. See id.; see also Donald R. Korobkin,
Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1996).
91
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2002). Defined contribution plans (or individual account plans)
are pensions provided for each participant and the benefits “are based solely upon the amount
contributed to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any
forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's
account.” Id.
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1. Defined Benefit Plans
Defined benefit plans are those plans under which the employer promises a fixed
periodic payment of funds during retirement. 92 These plans must meet funding
requirements93 including minimum rates of benefit accrual,94 insurance coverage by
the PBGC,95 and certain restrictions on termination of the plan.96 Most plans are set
up to pay the employee a set amount of money after retirement based on a percentage
income multiplied by a factor considering the employee's length of service.97 Others
may provide that the benefit amount will vary in conformance with some fixed
standard.98 The plan itself specifies the benefit that will be payable to the employee
or the beneficiary upon retirement or termination of employment.99
a. Advantages of Defined Benefit Plans
The greatest advantage of defined benefit plans is that the employee receives a
guaranteed benefit by the employer at retirement.100 If there is a shortfall resulting
from investment losses, it is the employer’s duty to make up the difference.101 Since
the employer bears the risk of the investment, employees do not have to invest in
low-risk and conservative funds.102 This low-risk type of pension investment appeals
to less sophisticated investors and employees because it decreases the heightened
responsibility and complex understanding of investing.103
Economically, defined benefit plans promote employee loyalty and long-term
employment resulting in an efficient capitalist market.104 For the employer, long-term
92
See Korobkin, supra note 90, at 20. Every defined benefit plan must cover the minimum
of 50 employees or 40 percent of the employer’s labor force. MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at
73. A basic pension plan that pays an annual pay increase of 5 percent will pay an annual
pension accrual of 1 percent for each year’s pay. See, e.g., Appendix D: Illustration of Career
Average Pension Accrual.
93

29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2002).

94

29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2002).

95

29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1321(b)(1), 1301-1461 (2002).

96

29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (2002).

97

See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX. REV. 683, 687
(2000); see also Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. PBGC, 103 B.R. 672, 680 (W.D. Pa.
1989). Formulas used by pension providers may vary according to factors such as an
employee’s age, length of service and past earnings. See Zelinsky, 19 VA. TAX REV., at 687.
98

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 201.

99

See Pratt, supra note 35, at 760; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2002).

100

Collins, supra note 19, at 607; see also Financial security, supra note 21, at 11.

101

See Collins, supra note 19, at 607.

102

Id.

103

See id. at 656.

104

See, e.g., Celia Silverman, Pension Evolution in a Changing Economy, Employee
Benefit Res. Inst. Special Rep. & Issue Brief, No. 141 (Sept. 1993). See also MCGILL ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 338-41.
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employment decreases the turnover rate of employees and reduces training cost.105
For the employee, long-term employment creates the potential to earn more money
for retirement through defined benefit pension plans.106 If the employee leaves the
current employer, the employee's plan must be vested at the time he or she leaves in
order to receive that pension income at retirement.107
Another advantage of a defined benefit plan is that it is insured by the PBGC.108
In the event that a plan becomes insolvent, the beneficiary of the defined benefit plan
will receive a portion of his or her promised defined benefit pension due to PBGC
coverage. 109 This advantage may appeal to employees because it is an insured
investment guaranteed at the time of retirement.
b. Disadvantages of Defined Benefit Plans
The disadvantage of defined benefit plans is that their benefits are smaller than
defined contribution plans. Additionally, the complexity of defined benefit plans
makes them difficult to understand and administer,110 which has contributed to the
marked decline in the use of defined benefit pension plans. 111 By 1995, defined
benefit plans among private sector employers numbered just 64,000, after peaking at
nearly 120,000 in 1977. 112 In 2001, this type of retirement plan numbered just
38,000.113
Additionally, there is a disadvantage for employees in monitoring a plan’s level
of funding. A company is required to file an annual report with the PBGC and to
notify the plan participants if its plan is underfunded by more than $50 million in
vested benefits.114 However, this requirement is not always carefully monitored by
the PBGC, and may lead to detrimental surprises to plan participants of underfunded
pensions.115

105

See NADER & BLACKWELL, supra note 1, at 13-16.

106

Daniel J. Sennott, Finding the Balance in Cash Balance Pension Plans, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1059, 1061 (2001). Since defined benefit plans do not transfer if the employee leaves his
or her current employers, employees may be more inclined to stay with the current employer
in order to accumulate a larger private pension benefit. Id.
107

Id.

108

Collins, supra note 19, at 607.

109

See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (2002).

110

Pratt, supra note 35, at 761.

111

U.S. Dept. of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Private Pension
Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 1996 Form, 5500 Annual Reports, Table E1 (1999).
112

Id.

113

See PBGC, supra note 16.

114

Financial security, supra note 21, at 11. Annual filing will continue until the plan is no
longer underfunded. Id.
115

Id.
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2. Defined Contribution Plans
In a defined contribution plan, or individual account plan,116 the employee and
often the employer contribute directly, making the plan benefits vest in full
immediately. 117 Many of the employer-sponsored plans, including IRAs, 401(k)
plans,118 and salary reduction Simplified Employer Pensions (“SEP”),119 entail the
employer paying a certain percentage of money into the plan. Although no specific
benefits are guaranteed at retirement, the employee may directly benefit from the
interest on a successful investment.120
a. Advantages of Defined Contribution Plans
This type of pension plan allows employees to have greater mobility among jobs.
Because the American workforce has become more mobile in job transitions,121 the
defined contribution plan may be more compatible with the younger generation
because it vests in full immediately for the funds contributed. 122 An employee
remains in control over pension funds even if he or she leaves the current place of
employment.123 Furthermore, the ability to roll over these funds into other defined
contribution plans or into individual retirement accounts allows an employee to keep
116
TAX PLANNING AND PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 63, at 6. The amount available at
retirement is the balance of the account. A distribution of the funds is made annually and must
equal the amount of the employee’s benefit divided by the applicable life expectancy. Id.
117
See ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. MCDERMED, THE CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN A
CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 66 (1990). The term “individual account plan” or
“defined contribution plan” means a pension plan which provided for an individual account
for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of
accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account. Id.; see
also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2002).
118

I.R.C. § 401(k) was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, Title I
135(a), 92 Stat. 2765, 2785 (1985). A 401(k) plan allows the employee to contribute a portion
of their income into the plan without being subject to income tax. Additionally, most
employers contribute or match a percentage of the amount in which the employee contributes.
401(k) plans are not subject to minimum funding requirements. See I.R.C. § 412; 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1081-1086 (2002). The 401(k) plan is one of the most popular plans and allows the
employee to determine the amount to personally contribute to the plan and the employer will
then typically match the contribution. See Sennott, supra note 106, at 1062 (citing Olivia S.
Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber, Defined Contribution Pensions: New Opportunities, New
Risks, in Living with Defined Contribution Pensions: Making Responsibility for Retirement 3
fig. 2 (1998)).
119

See Pratt, supra note 35, at 759-71; see also MCGILL et al., supra note 25, at 299-306.

120

See Pratt, supra note 35, at 759-61.

121

See CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 117, at 32. Employers with high training costs
may prefer defined benefit plans as a part of a compensation package in order to increase longterm service, which may increase efficiency and productivity. Id.
122
John R. Keville, Retire at Your Own Risk: ERISA’s Return on Investment?, 68 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 527, 541 (1994).
123

Id. at 542.
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the same fund throughout his or her career.124 These reasons have led to the increased
growth of defined contribution plans in the past few decades.125
b. Disadvantages of Defined Contribution Plans
The largest disadvantage of a defined contribution plan is that the employee bears
the risk of return on the investment 126 because there is not a guaranteed level of
benefits promised to the employee.127 Therefore, a defined contribution plan pays an
amount equal to the plan assets regardless of whether the plan experienced gains or
losses.128 Moreover, defined contribution plans are not insured by the PBGC.129 In
the event of a market failure, employees will receive only the balances of their
individual plans.130
3. Current Trend between Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Defined Contribution
Pension Plans.
Over the past several years, the use of defined benefit pension plans has
decreased while the adoption of defined contribution plans has increased.131 Indeed,
between 1984 and 1993 alone, defined contribution plans have grown by almost
900%.132 The contributing factors for this shift in pension plans include the increased
government regulation of defined benefit pensions, increased administrative costs,
employment growth in small businesses, and the greater mobility that defined
contribution plans offer.133
D. Types of Employers
The PBGC insures and administers two types of plans: “single-employer” and
“multi-employer” plans.134

124

Id. at 543.

125

Pratt, supra note 35, at 749-50.

126

Id. at 761.

127

Id. at 759.

128

Id.

129

Collins, supra note 19, at 607.

130

PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 637 (1990).

131

Plan Administration, supra note 79, at 14. Although there has been a large decrease in
the amount of plans, there has been an increase in the total number of participants. Id. The
number of participants has increased from 35.5 million in 1980 to 44 million in 2001. Id.
However, the total number of participants includes both active workers and retirees. Id.
132

JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 51 (3d
ed. 2000).
133
Keville, supra note 122, at 535 (citing CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 116, at 5); see
also MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 39-42.
134

PBGC, supra note 16, at 30-33. The single-employer and multiemployer programs are
separate programs in which ERISA provides with revolving funds to be used by the PBGC in
order to support operational and administrative functions of the PGBC and also fund deficits
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1. “Single-employer” Plans
An individual employer establishes a “single-employer” plan in order to protect
the benefits of its employees.135 When a “single-employer” plan is terminated either
voluntarily by the employer or involuntarily by the PBGC and there are insufficient
funds to pay the benefits, the PBGC is liable for guaranteed benefits for the
underfunded terminated plans up to the designated statutory amount.136 Furthermore,
the PBGC may involuntarily terminate the plan if the employer is unable to fund the
program.137 If the PBGC terminates a plan, it must guarantee payment of the nonforfeitable benefits.138
Currently, “single-employer” plans cover about 35 million workers and
retirees.139 In 2001, 101 underfunded plans were terminated, mostly involuntarily by
the PBGC.140 The largest reason for PBGC's terminations were that the sponsoring
employer's plans were underfunded or the sponsoring employer went out of
business.141 As a result, “single-employer” plans reported a net loss of almost $2
billion in 2001.142

incurred by PBGC. Id. Premiums are collected from the ongoing plans and are accounted for
through the revolving funds. See id. at 32-33.
The Pension Protection Act of 1987 created a single-employer revolving fund that is
credited with all premiums in excess of $8.50 per participant, including all penalties
and interest charged on these amounts, as well as investment income. This fund may
not be used to pay PBGC’s administrative costs or benefits of any plan terminated
prior to October 1, 1988 unless no other amounts are available.
Id. at 32.
135

29 U.S.C. § 1002(41). “The term ‘single-employer plan’ means an employee benefit
plan other than a multi-employer plan.” Id.
136

29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (2002).
The net liability assumed by PBGC is generally equal to the present value of the future
benefits (including amounts owed under Section 4022(c) of ERISA) less (1) the
amounts that are provided by the plan’s assets and (2) the amounts that are recoverable
by PBGC from the plan sponsor and members of the plan sponsor’s controlled group,
as defined by ERISA.
PBGC, supra note 16, at 32.
137

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. PBGC, 103 B.R. 672, 679 (W.D. Pa. 1989).

138

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1361 (2002).

139

PBGC, supra note 16, at 9.

140

Id. In 2001, some of the largest plans in PBGC's twenty-seven year history were
terminated including: “Trans World Airlines (36,500 workers and retirees), The Grand Union
Company (17,000 workers and retirees), Outboard Marine Corporation (10,000 workers and
retirees), Bradlees Stores (8,000 workers and retirees), Northwestern Steel and Wire Company
(4,000 workers and retirees) and Laclede Steel Company (4,000 workers and retirees).” Id.
141

Id.

142

Id. at 30.
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2. “Multi-employer” Plans
A “multi-employer” plan is established by a collective bargaining agreement and
covers workers of one or more unrelated employers.143 Currently, “multi-employer”
plans cover about 9.4 million workers and retirees.144
“Multi-employer” plans are funded and administered differently and separately
from the “single-employer” plans. 145 Instead of the triggering event being a
termination used in “single-employer” plans, “multi-employer” plans trigger PBGC
guarantees when there is an inability of a covered plan to pay benefits.146 If a plan
becomes insolvent, the PBGC will financially assist the plan in order to pay
participants their guaranteed benefits.147 The guarantee of plan benefits by the PBGC
operates as a loss to the corporation. Earnings such as “future plan contributions,
employer withdrawal liability or investment” do not go to the PBGC for the losses
accrued.148 In 2001, the PBGC had a net loss of $151 million due to some of the
largest “multi-employer” plan terminations in history.149
E. ERISA Requirements of Pension Plans
ERISA has certain requirements that employers who provide private pension
plans must follow. These requirements are a integral part in the management of
pensions.
1. Vesting Requirements
When a plan participant enters payment status, retirement, death or total
disability benefits are vested. 150 However, if the employee leaves the employer
before any benefits are vested, death and disability benefits usually will not be
143

See Korobkin, supra note 90, at 21. A “multi-employer plan” is a plan –
(i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute, (ii) which is maintained
pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more
employee organizations and more than one employer, and (iii) which satisfies such
other requirements as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(37).
144

PBGC, supra note 16, at 13.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 32.

149

See PBGC, supra note 16, at 30.

150

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 103.
[V]esting may occur immediately or at some future date. . . . Immediate vesting is
infrequently found among conventional pension plans. Vesting is generally deferred
until stipulated service requirements are met. Immediate vesting is more often found
in profit-sharing plans, which are considered plans of deferred compensation rather
than plans providing retirement income. It is more difficult to justify deferred
compensation plan since the services that earned the compensation were provided
even if the payment of the compensation was deferred to a later date.
Id. at 104.
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paid. 151 But if the employee terminates employment after becoming vested, the
employee will be eligible for death and total disability benefits if death or disability
occurs before the employee’s benefit payments begin.152
ERISA established minimum vesting standards after a short period of service to
assure equal and fair treatment of all plan participants, to remove barriers to longterm employment, and to ensure the social role of private pension plans in providing
retirement benefits. 153 Normally, pension benefits will vest and become nonforfeitable to the participant or the participant's spouse upon the completion of no
more than seven years of service.154
2. Diversification
Diversity of plan assets is the best method to earn money through hedging the
risks of investments. Diversification protects plan assets against the exposure to one
source of risk, which may lead to a detrimental downfall in one's assets. 155
Additionally, diversification helps the employer to hedge any losses that may occur
from high-risk investments. 156 ERISA requires plan trustees to diversify plan
investments in order to minimize the risk of losses.157 Diversification provides a riskminimizing way to invest, which benefits both employers and employees.
3. Information
It is important that plan investors have sufficient information about their
investment choices and investment advisor. 158 It is required that the plan must
provide enough information about the plan to allow the plan investor to make an
educated investment. 159 However, the sponsoring employer will be deemed an
investment advisor and will be liable for the investment if too much information is
provided on investments.160 The liability to plan investors associated with investment
guidance has left employers hesitant to provide investors with information.161
Employers may hire an outside service provider to provide investment advice to
the investors. However, the employer is still liable if this advisor breaches its

151

Death and total disability benefits are intended to extend only to active employees. Id.
at 104.
152

Upon the death of the participant, the annual benefit must be paid to a “qualified preretirement survivor.” Id.
153

Id. at 106.

154

29 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1055 (2002).

155

ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 981 (5th ed. 2002).

156

Id. at 208-09.

157

29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2002).

158

See Dana M. Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee Benefit
Programs: Boomers, Benefits, and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1351, 1374-75 (1997).
159

See id.

160

Id. at 1375.

161

See id.
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fiduciary duty to plan investors.162 Therefore the advisor is still hesitant to give such
investment advice. If the advisor receives a fee for the investment advice, the advisor
would be an ERISA fiduciary and may be subject to liability.163
There are two views to employers giving employees information. The first view
protects the employer from liability by providing investment information to the
plan’s investors.164 The second view takes into consideration the giving of too much
investment advice to the employee because the employer will then face fiduciary
liability. 165 ERISA fiduciary law discourages employers to provide investment
advice, a result that is contrary to the employee's best interest. Therefore, to increase
the employer's obligation to give investment advice, the fiduciary liability would
have to decrease.166
Overall, employers may provide investment advice to the investor about the
benefit plans they sponsor for two reasons. First, employers design benefit pension
plans to respond to the needs of the workforce.167 Second, employers try to ensure
that employees can maximize their retirement earnings to the extent of high
investment. 168 Therefore, it seems consistent with public policy that sufficient
information be given to plan participants.
4. Fiduciary Responsibilities
Fiduciary responsibility extends to any person who exerts any discretionary
authority over the management of pension plans or any person who renders
investment advice for compensation.169 ERISA mandates that fiduciaries act “with

162

Id. at 1365.

163

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)-(ii) (2002).

164

See Muir, supra note 158, at 1364-67. Professor Muir analyzes the liability issues the
employer faces regarding investment education and investment advice. However, she
discusses how important it is to the investor to have adequate knowledge about the plans that
he or she may be paying into. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 401(c) (2003).
165
Dana Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice & Investment Education: Is No
Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 19 (2002).
166

Muir, supra note 158, at 1364-67.

167

See id.

168

See id.

169

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 54. This definition includes the following individuals
to be fiduciaries: “directors and certain officers of the plan’s sponsor, members of a plan’s
investment committee, and persons who select these individuals.” Id.; see also ERISA §
3(21); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
(a) Prudent man standard of care (1) . . . a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and - (A) for
the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; (C) by diversifying the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and (D) in accordance with the
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the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”170 If the fiduciary
fails to act in accordance with this statute, ERISA will hold the fiduciary personally
liable to the plan for loses resulting from a breach of her fiduciary duties.171
This fiduciary standard aims to prohibit fiduciaries from taking unprecedented
risks with other people's pension funds. 172 While this standard can create much civil
liability on behalf of plan fiduciaries, a plan may purchase insurance to protect the
plans assets and fiduciaries from being held liable. 173 However, the ability of an
employer to insure against a liability of a plan fiduciary creates a major conflict in
regards to pension funds. Employers who participate in defined benefit plans may
take unreasonable investment risk in order to receive the excess interest profits.174 As
a result, employees' ability to receive pension funds is at a higher risk without
sufficient insurance to cover the full amount of the plan.
5. The “Moral Hazard” Problem
There is a “moral hazard” problem with insuring defined benefit plans. Insurance
against certain risks decreases the incentive for a person to invest in risk adverse
assets.175 For example, a sponsoring employer who has PBGC insurance protection is
more likely to invest in high-risk, high-yield instruments with the goal of earning a
larger return and decreasing retirement contributions in that it would be only
secondarily liable for the plan’s assets if it became insolvent.176 While ERISA was
amended to hold sponsors liable to reimburse the PBGC for the benefits paid to plan
participants,177 collection from these sponsors rarely occurs. 178

documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and
instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title and title IV.
§ 1104(a).
170

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2002).

171

ERISA § 409; 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2002).

172

MGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 54.

173

Se generally id. For example, civil liability can ensue from plan fiduciaries being sued
for neglgently of investing funds. Id.
174

Jefferson, supra note 76, at 664.

175

Id. (citing Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 65, 66-68).
176

See, e.g., id. Although this article uses an example of the “moral hazard” problem with
reference to a defined contribution plan sponsor, the same result would occur with a defined
benefit plan sponsor. Id. “For a moral hazard problem to exist, there must be some element of
reactive risk involved.” Keating, supra note 175, at 68. Meaning that the insured sponsor must
have some opportunity to implement due care. Id.
177
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(1987). This act increased the employers plan liability to the PBGC by removing the 30% cap.
Id.
178

See PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 638.
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In determining if a “moral hazard” problem of insurance exists, one must
distinguish between reactive risk and fixed risk.179 A reactive risk is a risk that the
insured has some ability to control (i.e., personal accident) while a fixed risk is a risk
that the insured has no control (i.e., natural disaster).180 If an employer is insuring
against a reactive risk, there is a “moral hazard” problem.
F. Role of the PBGC
The legal role of the PBGC over a plan’s assets begins upon the termination of a
pension plan.181 A plan terminates only upon one of the following events: (1) death
of the plan participant; (2) disability, retirement or severance of from employment by
the plan participant;182 (3) termination of the plan by the employer or the PBGC;183 or
(4) attainment of normal retirement age by the plan participant as provided in the
plan. 184 Additionally, the PBGC may terminate a plan involuntarily 185 or the
employer may terminate the plan voluntarily.186
One example of the PBGC’s role in insuring pensions is as follows. When a plan
is terminated by an employer without sufficient assets to pay its pension obligations,
the PBGC becomes trustee of the plan, taking over the plan’s assets and liabilities.187
The PBGC then disburses the plan’s assets to cover what it can of the benefit
obligations.188 After the PBGC pays the benefit obligations of the employees, it may
assert a claim against the employer for reimbursement. 189 In order to do so, the
179

Keating, supra note 175, at 68.

180

Id.

181

29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2002); see also In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. 672,
679 (W.D.Pa. 1989). The PBGC may not become the trustee of the plan until several years
after the plan’s termination. PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16, at 10. The PBGC will
start to monitor plans that are underfunded by 10 percent. See Financial security, supra note
21, at 11.
182
See Rev. Rul. 56-693, 1956-2 C.B. 282; Rev. Rul. 74-417, 1974-2 C.B. 131 (finding
that in certain circumstances, benefits may be distributed prior to severance of employment).
183

See I.R.C. § 401 (2003); ERISA §§ 1341, 1342(a). In “single-employer” plans, a plan
termination can be made voluntarily by the employer or involuntarily by the PBGC. See id.
184

See Rev. Rul. 71-24, 1971-1 C.B. 114; ERISA § 3(24); see also, supra note 62.

185

See 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2002). The PBGC may terminate a plan involuntarily when
“(1) the plan has not met the minimum funding standard required...(2) the plan will be unable
to pay benefits when due...(4) the possible long-run loss of the corporation with respect to the
plan may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated.” Id.
186
See 29 U.S.C. § 1341. Employers may voluntarily terminate a plan through a standard
termination which occurs when the employer has sufficient assets to pay all benefits or a
distress termination which occurs when an employer demonstrates financial distress. Id.
187

See PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 14, at 9; PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S.
633, 637 (1990).
188

PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 637.

189

See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 162 (citing ERISA § 4062(a)). The amount of
assets that the PBGC can reach in the situation of an underfunded plan is not governed by the
plan sponsor's business form. Id.
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PBGC can obtain a lien to secure its claim by making a demand to the employer and
filing a public notice.190 The lien will go against the debtor/employer’s assets for the
amount of unfunded benefit liabilities to both plan participants and beneficiaries
from the date of plan termination and any delinquent minimum funding
contributions.191 Pension benefits normally vest and become non-forfeitable to the
participant or the participant's spouse upon the completion of no more than seven
years of service.192 To ensure payment of the remaining non-forfeitable benefits, the
PBGC adds its own funds.193
ERISA limits the benefits that the PBGC guarantees.194 First, the employee is
limited to a claim of no more than $4,000. 195 Secondly, the employer does not
actually pay the employee until liquidation of the company’s assets and dividends
are paid.196 To illustrate, if a company goes bankrupt, the PBGC is required to pay
plan participants the accrued and vested benefit up to the guaranteed amount.197 Like
creditors, employees have unsecured claims that entitle them to receive an equal
share of available assets.198 Unlike creditors, the PBGC is third in line to collect
those unsecured claims including wages, salaries and commissions to the extent of
“$4,000 for each individual or corporation . . . earned within 90 days before the date
of the filing of the petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business,
190

Korobkin, supra note 90, at 8-9; see 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2002).

191

See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(1)-(c) (2002).

192

29 U.S.C. §§ 1053(a)(2), 1055 (2002).

193

PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 637.

194

See 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2002).

195

See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2002).
Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan—(A)
arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the filing of the
petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor’s business, whichever occurs first;
but only (B) for each such plan, to the extent of –(i) the number of employees covered
by each such plan multiplied by $4,650; less (ii) the aggregate amount paid to such
employees under paragraph (3) of this subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid by
the estate on behalf of such employees to any other employee benefit plan.
Id. For a person who retires at the age of 65, the maximum benefit insurable is approximately
$35,000 per year. See Jefferson, supra note 76, at 610. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 104; see Korobkin,
supra note 89, at 10.
196

See 29 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2002); See Korobkin, supra note 90, at 10.

197

Jefferson, supra note 76, n. 11. The PBGC guarantees “basic benefits,” which include
(1) pension benefits at normal retirement age, (2) most early retirement benefits, (3) disability
benefits for certain disabilities, and (4) certain benefits for survivors of plan participants. Id.
The maximum monthly benefit paid by the PBGC for a plan terminated in 2000 is $3,221.59.
Id. Benefits “include all retirement, death, and disability benefits of current retirees and, for
vested current participants, the regular retirement benefit payable under the normal annuity
form.” Id. However, basic benefits do not include those plans that encourage early retirement.
Alicia H. Munnell, ERISA—The First Decade: Was the Legislation Consistent With Other
National Goals, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 51, 54. The employer becomes liable to the PBGC
upon termination of the plan. See PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633.
198

Korobkin, supra note 90, at 7-8.
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whichever occurs first.”199 Thereafter, the PBGC is fourth to collect unsecured claims
contributions to an employee benefit plan. 200 Unfortunately for employees and
retirees, this coverage does not guarantee the full amount of the promised employee
pension, but it does provide some compensation to the employee.201
1. Premiums
The PBGC covers most defined benefit plans. 202 Unlike other government
agencies, the PBGC is not funded by general tax revenues.203 Instead, to finance
benefit payments, the PBGC obtains funding from two sources: (1) annual insurance
premiums paid by the administrators of covered plans,204 and (2) employer liability
payments collected by the PBGC from employers with unfunded or underfunded
plans.205 Each business engaged in providing defined benefit pension plans pays a

199

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)

200

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).

201

Jill L. Uyalki, Promises Made, Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Pension
Plan Income in the Wake of Employer Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation?, 6 ELDER L.J. 77 (1998) (referring to Communications
& Pub. Affairs Dep’t, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Facts: Retirement Protection Act of 1994
(rev. Mar. 1996)). This note proposes to hold employers financially responsible for pension
plans by granting PBGC lien priority status under the federal Bankruptcy Code. See id.
202

Financial security, supra note 21, at 11. The PBGC does not cover pension plans with
less than 26 plan participants. Id. Government pension plans are not insured by the PBGC. Id.
Additionally, ERISA places limits to the amount recoverable from the PBGC. Id. The PBGC
will not cover lump sums, vacation pay, and severance over $5,000. Also, the PBGC will not
make cost-of-living adjustments. Id.
203
Walsh, supra note 18, at A1; see generally Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 1995
Annual Report (1995), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/ annrpt/95annrpt.pdf.
The PBGC charges employers an annual premium based on their insurance program. Id.
Section 1306(a)(3) states:
the annual premium rate payable to the corporation by all plans for basic benefits
guaranteed under this title is—(i) in the case of a single-employer plan…an amount
equal to the sum of $ 19 plus the additional premium (if any)…; (ii) in the case of a
multiemployer plan…an amount for each individual who is a participant in such plan
for such plan year equal to the sum of--(I) 50 cents, multiplied by a fraction the
numerator of which is the number of months in such year ending on or before such
date and the denominator of which is 12, and (II) $ 1.00, multiplied by a fraction equal
to 1 minus the fraction determined under clause (i), (iii) in the case of a multiemployer
plan, for plan years beginning after the date of enactment of the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 [enacted Sept. 26, 1980], an amount equal to-(I) $ 1.40 for each participant, for the first, second, third, and fourth plan years, (II) $
1.80 for each participant, for the fifth and sixth plan years, (III) $ 2.20 for each
participant, for the seventh and eighth plan years, and (IV) $ 2.60 for each participant,
for the ninth plan year, and for each succeeding plan year.
29 U.S.C. § 1306.
204

29 U.S.C. §§ 1306, 1307.

205

29 U.S.C. § 1362(b); See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. PBGC, 103 B.R. 672, 679
(W.D.Pa. 1989).
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premium for each person covered by the PBGC.206 For example, the premium for
unfunded benefits is $9 per $1,000 of promised pension. 207 In 2001, the PBGC’s
premiums for both “single-employer” and “multi-employer” programs accounted for
an income of $845 million, however, the net loss in that year was $2.123 billion.208
Even with this deficit, the PBGC will insure defined benefit pensions if the employer
fails to pay their premium or becomes insolvent.209 Although the employer becomes
liable to the PBGC for the insured benefits paid,210 there is little chance that the
PBGC will recover the entire portion of that liability. 211 In trying to resolve the
PBGC's deficit, Congress has increased the annual premiums of employers.212 Yet,
these increases have not sustained the growth of the PBGC deficit.213
2. Benefits
Each year ERISA sets the PBGC’s maximum benefit guarantee. In 2002, pension
plans were guaranteed the maximum amount of $3,579.55 per month for a worker
who retires at age 65.214 If one begins receiving payments before age 65 or if one's
pension includes benefits for a survivor or other beneficiary, the guaranteed benefit
will be lower.215
III. CURRENT STATUS OF PBGC
Today, federal tax incentives given to private pensions consume more corporate
revenue than any other fringe benefit given to employees.216 Since the early 1980s,
there has been a decrease in the use of defined benefit pension plans.217 In 1995, the
number of PBGC insured defined benefit plans was around 114,000 while in 2001,
that number decreased to slightly more than 35,000 plans. 218 In 2001 alone, the
PBGC reported a net loss of $2.123 billion.219

206

See Walsh, , supra note 18, at A1.

207

Collins, supra note 19, at 607.

208

PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16, at 30.

209

See Muir, supra note 157.

210

PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 638 (1990).

211

Id. at 638.

212

Id.

213

See PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16.

214

Id. This monthly amount produces an annual salary of $42,954.60 per year.

215

Id.

216
SASS, supra note 27, at 2. There is a possible exception to health insurance. Id. Private
pension funds and state and local pension funds together hold 25.1% of corporate equities in
the United States. BODIE ET. AL., supra note 155, at 5.
217

SASS, supra note 27, at 2.

218

Id. at 14.

219

Id. at 30.
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Currently, the PBGC insures defined benefit pensions plans covering nearly 44
million American workers and retirees. 220 By year-end of 2001, the PBGC was
responsible for the pension benefits of about 624,000 participants from both “singleemployer” and “multi-employer” plans.221 Nearly 269,000 people received benefit
payments totaling more than $1 billion,222 marking the first time that the PBGC’s
annual benefit payments surpassed $1 billion.223
Thus far, the PBGC has been successful in insuring pension plans and improving
the financial future for millions of employees.224 It is important to secure the future
of the PBGC in order to secure the future of retirees. The wave of employer
bankruptcies and underfunded or unfunded defined benefit plans has left millions of
Americans with depleted retirement funds and inadequate time to build any
retirement savings. Many employees turn to the PBGC for help to receive the
pension benefits promised, but the large deficit of the PBGC and the lack of
employer responsibility makes filling these pension promises a difficult task. 225
Unfortunately, this problem of plan terminations is only expected to worsen leaving
the PBGC with a burden much higher than it bargained for.226
A. Downward Trend of the Economy
There has been a significant decline in the economy's prosperity. At the end of
fiscal year 2002, investment companies managed a total of $6.7 trillion.227
During the fiscal year, stock prices continued to retreat from record highs set in
2000, with the major stock indices recording declines of between 11 and 19 percent.
The technology-oriented NASDAQ Composite index closed at 1,172.06 on
September 30, 2002, down more than 75 percent from its March 10, 2000, peak of
5,048. At the end of 2002, a total of 31,100 investment company portfolios were
managed or sponsored by 995 investment company complexes. Open-end
management investment companies, commonly known as mutual funds, comprise
the largest segment of the investment company industry as approximately 54 million
U.S. households, representing 50 percent of total households, own mutual funds.228

220

Id. at 14.

221

Id.

222

See SASS, supra note 27, at 1.

223

Id.

224

See, e.g., American Metal Market, Republic Hiking Pension Fund, Nov. 5, 1998, at 12.
The PBGC made an agreement with the new owners of Republic Engineered Steels Inc.,
Massillon, Ohio to provide an additional $178 million financing for the company's
underfunded pension plan. Id. This agreement gave 3,600 steelworkers a much better financial
standing for retirement. Id.
225

See generally PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16.

226

Id. The PBGC expects to represent double the participants in 2002 that it did in 2001.

Id.
227

Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002 SEC Annual Report, 52-53, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep02.shtml (last modified Jan. 28, 2003).
228

Id.
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Given the current investment landscape, “[t]he risk that thousands of American
workers will not receive [their promised] retirement benefits continues to worsen.”229
In 2001, the PBGC defended 122,000 participants of defined benefit pension plans in
118 cases, due to the bankruptcies of companies that sponsor defined benefit pension
plans.230 For example, the Enron accounting fraud caused many of the company’s
employees to lose their entire retirement savings as their employer’s stock
dramatically decreased in value.231 The State of Florida alone lost $330 million in
state pension plans from the Enron scandal.232
The bankruptcy of LTV Corporation led the PBGC to assume pension payments
of $1.6 billion in March 2002.233 The PBGC assumed unfunded pension claims of
$1.1 billion from National Steel and assumed $3.7 billion from Bethlehem Steel.234
Another leading example of an enormous loss of pensions is the WorldCom
scandal. WorldCom’s illegal bookkeeping caused New York City police and
firefighters to lose $100 million from their pension plans235 and the entire state to
lose $300 million. 236 Additionally, the Massachusetts pension plan lost $25
million, 237 the State of Maryland's pension plan lost about $52 million and
Washington State lost $83 million.238 The WorldCom scandal also caused the State
of California to lose $1 billion in pension funds;239 the state pension system alone
lost $590 million.240
Furthermore, experts expect that 600,000 retired steelworkers241 may suffer a loss
of retirement benefits that may lead to billions of dollars of unfunded liabilities by
insolvent corporations.242 Public pension funds lost more than $4 billion from the
WorldCom scandal alone.243

229

Robert S. Marsel, Mandatory Arbitration under ERISA: Pay Now, Dispute Later, 20 N.
KY. L. REV. 441 (quoting U.S. Pension Threat Continues to Grow, NEWSDAY (New York),
Nov. 20, 1992).
230

PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16, at 22.

231

Kennedy, supra note 12, 491-93.

232

Joel Connelly, Pension Fund Meltdowns Cause That Sinking Feeling, THE SEATTLE
POST INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 16, 2002 at A2.
233

Walsh, supra note 18.

234

Id.

235

Connelly, supra note 232, at A2.

236

Arnold Beichman, Pension Fallout Anxieties, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002 at A14.

237

Id.

238

Id.

239

See Connelly, supra note 232.

240

See Beichman, supra note 236.

241

Will, supra note 7, at A33. This equates to 30 times more employees than Enron. Id.

242

Id.

243

Beichman, supra note 236, at A14.
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Due to the current economic conditions, Congress is proposing new legislation
pertaining to ERISA. 244 The Supreme Court has seen the PBGC being taken
advantage of by employers through plan terminations.245 Unfortunately, the PBGC's
insurance system has resulted in a society where some employers are abusing the
social benefit of the PBGC by promising larger retirement benefits without the
ability or concern to pay them.246
While these current economic conditions may be temporary, they have had a
detrimental effect on pension plans. This economic situation warns that a pension
plan proposal must incorporate a contingency plan that will secure retirement assets
even in the event of economic tragedy.
B. Future of Employee Benefits
If bankruptcies and massive unfunded pension liabilities persist, the demands on
the PBGC will increase and its deficit will worsen.247 The $8 million surplus that the
PBGC once had is rapidly decreasing.248 If this trend continues, the future of pension
plans will be greatly threatened.249 Employees will be unable to call upon the PBGC
for promised benefits in the case of a plan termination. Therefore, Congress must
take steps to protect the financial future of the PBGC.
IV. CURRENT PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
There are several possible approaches to the problem of unfunded and
underfunded pension plans, including two bills currently pending in Congress and
other proposals by legal scholars. None of these solutions seem to solve the issue at
hand. This section will explain the existing proposals and their problems.

244

See, e.g., infra notes 247-48.

245

Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359 (1980).

246

Uylaki, supra note 201, at 105 (citing Impact of Underfunded Defined-Benefit Pension
Plans on the Federal Deficit, Plan Retirees, and Plan Sponsors: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Oversight of the House Comm. On Ways & Means, 103d Cong. 5 (1993)).
247

See generally PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16, at 9-14.

248

Walsh, supra note 18, at A1; see PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16. In 2001,
the net loss was $2,123 billion compared to a net gain of $2,734 billion in 2000. SingleEmployer programs alone accounted for a net loss of $1,972 billion compared to the net
income in 2000 of $2,666 billion. PBGC 2001 Annual Report, supra note 16. “The $4,638
billion decrease was primarily attributable to the net change in losses from completed and
probable terminations and in financial activity.” Id. Multiemployer programs reported a net
loss of $151 million in 2001. Id.
249
See generally MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 140. The PBGC was of high concern
during President George Bush's Administration because it was possible that the agency could
lose an increased amount of $10 billion from 1989 to 1993. Id. Furthermore, the PBCG
vulnerability induced President Clinton's administration to improve and amend the PBGC's
role in insuring pension plans and in bankruptcy claims. Id.
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A. Proposed Legislation
Currently, there are numerous pieces of legislation in Congress that address some
aspect of pension plans. Among these are the Protecting America’s Pensions Act of
2002250 and the Pension Security Act of 2002.251
1. Protecting America's Pension Act of 2002
The Protecting America’s Pensions Act of 2002, introduced on March 6, 2002,252
proposes “[t]o amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to
improve diversification of plan assets for participants in individual account plans, to
improve disclosure, account access, and accountability under individual account
plans, and for other purposes.”253
The bill also proposes an increase in pension benefit information to participants
in both individual account plans and defined benefit plans.254 Specifically, the Act
requires that a plan administrator supply the plan participant or beneficiary with a
pension benefit statement at least every three years and upon request.255 Under this
Act, the statement shall provide recent information regarding the plan benefits, to be
written in plain English, or in a manner comprehensible to the average participant,
and it must be provided in written, electronic or other appropriate form reasonably
accessible to the participant.256
2. Pension Security Act of 2002
The Pension Security Act of 2002, introduced in the House of Representatives on
February 14, 2002,257 would amend title I of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 to provide extra protection to participants and beneficiaries in defined
contribution plans. This legislation proposes to curtail excessive investment in
employer securities and to increase investment counseling to workers managing their
personal retirement assets. 258 Additionally, this legislation seeks to amend the
250

See Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. (2002).

251

See Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R.3762, 107th Cong. (2002).

252

S. 1992.

253

Id. This Act will amend §105(a) of ERISA [29 U.S.C. 1025(a)] according to § 201(a) of
the Protecting America’s Pension Act of 2002. See id.
254

Id. at § 201(a)(1)(A)-(B).
(A) The administrator of an individual account plan shall furnish a pension benefit
statement—(i) at least once each calendar quarter to a plan participant of an individual
account plan which permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the
assets in his or her account, and (ii) to a plan participant or beneficiary upon request.
(B) The administrator of a defined benefit plan shall furnish a pension benefit
statement—(i) at lease once every 3 years to each participant, and (ii) to a participant
or beneficiary of the plan upon written request.
Id.
255

Id. at § 201(a)(1)(B). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

256

Id. at § 201(a)(2)(A).

257

H.R. 3762.

258

See id.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to protect plan participants and beneficiaries
against insider trading.259
Specifically, the Pension Security Act of 2002 proposes to secure pension plans
through provision of periodic pension benefit statements, information and
educational support for pension plan fiduciaries. 260 The more knowledge plan
participants have, the more informed their decisions will be about their financial
future. Therefore, if employees do plan to invest money into defined contribution
plans, their financial future will be more protected through knowledge and
diversification. Additionally, the information required by the employer will be more
likely to put the employee on notice of any financial difficulties the company may be
having.
The Pension Security Act has recently been passed by the House of
Representatives and is pending resolution in the Senate. 261 The compelling state of
our economy was reflected in the resolution.
Whereas recent events have highlighted the need to provide American
workers with stronger pension protections and greater access to
professional investment advice, the Pension Security Act of 2002 would
provide working Americans with more investment education and
information regarding their retirement plans, greater access to professional
investment advice, rights to diversified pension plan assets, protections
against corporate abuses and mismanagement of pensions, and other
reforms that would increase pension coverage;…the Pension Security Act
of 2002 would enhance the retirement security of American workers.262
3. Arguments in Support of the Proposed Legislation
Though this legislation relates primarily to defined contribution plans, both could
also assist in the improvement of defined benefit plans. For instance, an increase in
diversification of low-risk funds may be beneficial to plan participants in that they
are more likely to be guaranteed their promised pension. Mandating the employer to
furnish adequate information to the plan participant will keep the participant more
informed about his or her pension plan.263 Accountability among plan administrators
and monitors would surely reduce the possibility of unfunded or underfunded plans.

259

Id.

260

H.R. 3762. Title I—Improvements in Pension Security. Section 101. Periodic pension
benefit statements. Section 103. Informational and educational support for pension plan
fiduciaries. The Act also implements civil penalties for failure to comply with these standards.
261

Pension Security Act of 2002 H. Res. 540, In the House of Representatives, (Sept. 25,
2002) available at http://www.thomas.loc.gov. On April 11, 2002, by a vote of 255 to 163, a
bipartisan majority of the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3762, the Pension Security
Act of 2002. Id.
262

H.R. Res. 540.

263

H.R. 3762 § 2(a)(1). Section 2(e)(1)(A)-(B) requires these statements to inform the
participant of the value of investments allocated to the individual account and an explanation,
understandable by the average participant, of the diversified investment portfolio and the risks
involved. Id.
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Last but not least, minimizing plan asset investment in employer securities will
sufficiently separate the burden of an unsuccessful business year from affecting
pension plan assets.
4. Counter Arguments to the Proposed Legislation
The PBGC remains financially vulnerable to underfunding of large plans,
economic downfalls, and interest rate declines.264 The legislation currently proposed
in Congress will not succeed in providing a security of defined benefit plans. While
the proposals regarding defined contribution plans seem promising in the increase of
disclosures and diversification, they are only a bandage on to the larger problem of
inadequate pension funds that society faces. These proposals meaningfully focus on
employers while ignoring the financial burdens of the PBGC.
B. Alternative Solutions to Guaranteeing Pension Funds
Many scholars have proposed solutions to eliminate the PBGC's massive
financial burden. These proposals include the PBGC achieving lien priority status in
a bankruptcy proceeding and insuring defined contribution plans. These plans are
discussed more elaborately below.
1. Lien Priority Status
One proposed solution to guaranteeing pension funds is for the PBGC to have
lien priority status in a bankruptcy proceeding. 265 This proposal aims to hold
employers financially responsible for defined benefit pension plans.266 In order to do
so, the PBGC would perfect a lien against the employer before the employer files for
bankruptcy. This procedure is similar to that of a tax or statutory lien. 267 Through
this method of obtaining a lien priority, the PBGC would obtain secured creditor
status.268
For this proposal to work, the PBGC must make a demand to the employer for
payment and file notice of its lien all before the employer files Chapter 11.269 The
narrow time period creates a minimal opportunity to use this solution.270 Overall,
264
See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Financial Condition Improving, but LongTerm Risks Remain, GAO/HEHS-99-5 (Oct. 16, 1998).
265

Uylaki, supra note 201, at 80-81. By granting the PBGC lien priority status under
section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors would have the incentive to “monitor the
underfunded employer and would simultaneously bolster the PBGC's enforcement powers.”
Id. at 111.
266

Id. at 106. It is proposed that by giving the PBGC lien priority status, two public policy
goals would be achieved. “First, congressional action would dispel the myth that the PBGC
was designed to subsidize unsuccessful corporate endeavors or employer mishandlings of
pension money…. Second, granting priority status would make it unmistakably clear that
employers may not unreasonably inflate their pension benefit programs to entice qualified
employees.” Id.
267

Id. at 94. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 506 (2002).

268

Uylaki, supra note 201, at 94.

269

Id.; see 11 U.S.C.S. §501(d).
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these strict restrictions would discourage employers from participating in pension
plans.
2. Insure Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans provide an important segment of retirement income
that may earn more money than a defined benefit plan but incur more risk. 271
Therefore, one scholar proposes to insure defined contribution plans against poor
investment performance that leaves uncertainties in retirement income.272 In order to
insure these plans, the “Hypothetical Account” proposal suggests guaranteeing an
average rate of return over a plan participant's working life.273
Although this solution sounds feasible, it has been largely criticized by
economists.274 First of all, it is difficult to insure a volatile investment.275 Second,
critics worry that employers will be deterred from establishing defined contribution
plans due to the increase of regulations, fiduciary rules, insurance requirements, and
funding rules. 276 Lastly, excessive administrative costs would be involved in the
development of any new insurance agency to regulate defined contribution plans,
collect premiums, and administer coverage.
V. SOLUTION
The economic realties surrounding pension funds must not be ignored when
finding the most beneficial way to provide adequate economic support during
retirement. 277 In order for people to provide themselves with adequate financial
support during retirement, cost-of-living expenses must be taken into account. The
real dollar value of fixed benefit pension payments decreases with inflation, a
problem aggravated by the continual increase in American life expectancy.278 Thus,

270

Uylaki, supra note 201, at 95. “[P]erfecting the PBGC lien prior to the bankruptcy
petition is seldom accomplished and proves to be a rather formidable task, because the singleemployer plan typically will not terminate until after the employer has commenced bankruptcy
proceedings.” Id.; see The Nat'l Bankr. Conference's Code Review Project, Reforming the
Bankruptcy Code: Final Report 95 (1994).
271

See supra notes 116-125.

272

See Jefferson, supra note 76, at 644.

273

Id. at 651-52. “The Hypothetical Account proposal allows sponsoring employers and
plan participants to insure some, or all, of an account balance, in exchange for the payment of
an annual insurance premium.” Id. at 652.
274

See BODIE ET. AL., supra note 155, at 989. Volatile assets are difficult if not impossible
to insure due to their unpredictable nature of assets tied to the market economy. Id.
275

See id.

276

Jefferson, supra note 76, at 682.

277

See INCOME SUPPORT POLICIES FOR THE AGED (G.S. Tolley & Richard V. Burkhauster
eds., 1976). .
278
See generally CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, MACROECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS & POLICIES 214 (13th ed. 1996). The wealth effect explains that the
purchasing power of a person's assets will decrease at a higher price level. Id.
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even if insured, fixed pension payments cannot fully fund an adequate retirement.279
However, it is beneficial for people to have a secure and low-risk portion of
retirement income. Since the PBGC-insured defined benefit plans are in crisis, a
financial and self-sustaining plan is needed.
The federal government’s ability to insure retirement income has declined
drastically. For years, Social Security and other benefit pension programs have been
a concern of both the older and younger generations.280 Many people, especially the
younger generation, do not anticipate Social Security government assistance
throughout retirement.281 This uncertainty has influenced many individuals to initiate
their own personal retirement plans through a variety of methods. Among these,
personal savings and stock investments have become the most popular and a rather
simple way for the average investor to prepare for retirement.282
While investing into both defined benefit and defined contribution plans will
provide a lower income than investing into defined contribution plans alone, the lowrisk insured pensions from a defined benefit plan provide a secure portion of
retirement income in the case economic downfalls. A solution that mandates
investment of plan assets into defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans
will be the most beneficial. Therefore, a sufficient solution to the problems of the
PBGC deficit in insuring unfunded or underfunded pension plans is for legislation to
be passed by Congress that will mandate the employer to invest a portion of defined
benefit pension plan assets into a low-risk investment. This solution is not intended
to diminish the importance of individual retirement investment as a potential for a
higher level of retirement income. Rather, this solution focuses on the importance of
a guaranteed income during retirement, which a defined pension plan ideally
achieves.
A. Importance of Maintaining Defined Benefit Plans
As stated previously, pension plans are one of the largest sources of retirement
income and need to be maintained and protected. 283 Although employers may
voluntarily participate in pension plans,284 the pension payments made to employees
are crucial to their retirement savings.285 Specifically, defined benefit plans provide
an employee with a promised benefit during retirement. Individuals who are too late
in their careers or too uneducated to invest are directly harmed by an employer's
empty promise of pension benefits. These employees and retirees then seek
assistance from the PBGC. With its increasing deficit, however, help may be
postponed.
279

Defined benefit pension plans are not adjusted with inflation or cost-of-living.

280

See generally Moore, supra note 11, at 543.

281

Id.

282

See SASS, supra note 27, at 252.

283

See Collins, supra note 19, 604-605.

284

See Karen M. Sakanashi, Note: Unfunded Vacation Benefits: Determining the Scope of
ERISA, 87 COLUM. L.R. 1702, 1722 fn. 95 (1987). Employers are under no obligation to
establish pension plans for their employees. Id.
285
See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 26-27. Employees rely on pension plans for
income during retirement. Id.
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B. Lower-Risk Investments
Investments that are low risk are appealing to risk-adverse investors. A number
of factors may play a part in creating and maintaining low-risk investments.
Particularly, the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) aids in insuring
certain types of investments.286 The FDIC is a nonprofit government organization
that insures bank deposits up to $100,000.287 This insurance includes coverage of
certificates of deposit, personal savings accounts, some individual retirement
accounts, and other bank deposits. Similar to the purpose of the PBGC, the FDIC
insures deposits if the bank becomes insolvent.288
Currently the FDIC has been unable to collect insurance premiums from a
majority of the banking industry because insurance funds exceed the designated
reserve ratio (DRR).289 If a bank's fund reserve ratio falls below the DRR, the FDIC
must either initiate an increase in premiums to offset the decrease in the reserve ratio
or charge at least 23 basis points (23 cents per $100 of deposits) until the reserve
ratio joins the DRR.290
1. Certificates of Deposit Accounts
Certificates of Deposit (“CDs”) provide a low-risk investment option that is
beneficial for those individuals approaching retirement.291 While banks provide CDs
at a higher interest rate then a regular savings account, these types of investments do
have limitations.292 Because a CD is a time deposit, it may not be withdrawn before
maturity without incurring a penalty.293 Nonetheless, CDs are insured by the FDIC,
protecting their investors in the case of insolvency.

286

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC 2000 Annual Report 3, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2000AnnualReport/BIF.html (last modified Jan. 10,
2002). After The Depression, Congress intended to restore the nation's confidence in the
banking industry by establishing an insurance company to insure deposits. Id. “The Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) was enacted to
reform, recapitalize, and consolidate the federal deposit insurance system.” Currently, the
FDIC insures a depositor up to $100,000. Id.
287

Id.

288

See generally BODIE ET AL., supra note 155, at 94.

289

FDIC 2000 Annual Report, supra note 286, at 1-2. The FDIC is required to maintain a
ratio of required reserves to insured deposition (DRR) equally 1.25 percent.
290

Id.

291

See generally Stephen D. Palmer, comment, What do you Get When you Cross a
Certificate of Deposit with an Annuity? The Retirement Certificate of Deposit Struggles for
Survival, 45 EMORY L.J. 1429, 1459 (1996).
292
See, e.g., Bankrate.com, Mar. 17, 2003 available at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/rate
/brm_dep_avg.asp. Comparing the rates between passbook and statement savings with the
varieties of CDs, it is evident that CDs render a larger interest rate.
293

See BODIE ET AL., supra note 155, at 31.
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2. Individual Retirement Accounts
Individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) are tax-sheltered accounts.294 All IRAs
are available to employees, self-employed persons or sole proprietors.295 Additionally
these accounts are available to those who work in the public and private sectors.296
IRAs are promoted by commercial banks, savings and loan associations, mutual
funds, life insurance companies and trust companies.297 Those savings and CD IRAs
provided by banks are insured by the FDIC.298
Annual contributions up to the maximum of the lesser of $3,000 or 100 percent
of a person's compensation is allowed.299 Once an individual reaches the age of 70½
years, no contribution is allowed for that tax year.300 If distributions are made before
the attainment of age 59½, except for death or disability, or after the age of 70½ , a
10 percent excise tax will be imposed.301 As long as investment earnings stay in the
plan, they are exempt from federal income taxation. 302 IRA assets may not be
commingled with other property unless it is an approved common investment fund or
common trust fund.303 Although some assets are invested in stocks, mutual funds and
money markets, a larger portion are invested in CDs or savings accounts.304 This
larger allocation into lower-risk funds creates a more secure investment.305
3. Simplified Employee Pensions
Simplified employee pensions (SEPs) are a simplified form of an employersponsored pension plan.306 Like an IRA, a SEP is vested in full from the beginning.307
These pensions are IRAs that are set up and financed for each individual employee

294

Id. at 881; see also MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 307. There are some exceptions to
tax deductions including an adjusted gross income that exceeds $40,000 for married couples
filing together, $0 for married couples filing individually, and $25,000 for unmarried people.
Id. Additionally, a tax deduction will not be available if the person participated in a qualified
plan in that year. Id.
295

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 306.

296

Id. at 307.

297

See id. at 309.

298

Id.

299

I.R.C. §§ 219(b)(1), 408(o) (2003).

300

I.R.C. § 219(d)(1) (2003).

301

See I.R.C. §§ 72(p), 219 (2003).

302

MCGILL ET AL., supra note 25, at 308. Unrelated business income is excluded from the
tax exemption. Id.
303

Id. at 309.

304

Id. at 310.

305

See generally id.

306

Id. at 312.

307

Id. at 314.
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by the employer.308 It is within the employer's full discretion to either allow each
employee to choose his or her own IRA or type of IRA, or the employer can choose
the agency and funding instrument for the employee's IRA. 309 Employers can
contribute the lesser of $40,000 or 25 percent of covered compensation in any tax
year.310
Employer contributions are not subject to federal income tax, 311 Social Security
Federal Insurance Contributions Act, and unemployment taxes.312 Additionally, like
IRAs, an employee must make a withdrawal no earlier then the age of 59½ (unless
caused by death or disability) and no later than 70½ to avoid the federal excise tax.313
4. Money Market Accounts
Money market accounts are a type of mutual fund that is “traded on the money
market are used by economic units to adjust their balance sheets for temporary cash
surpluses and deficits.”314 These accounts allow the investor to access money already
deposited in the financial institution. 315 While these accounts provide a safer
investment because they seek to preserve the investment, they also limit access to the
funds.316 The investor may not earn as much from an investment in a money market
account versus investments in stocks because the rates of return are usually lower.317
5. Bonds
A bond is defined as a loan an investor makes to a company or government
entity. 318 The bond market is composed of corporate bonds, municipal bonds,

308

Id. at 312.

309

Id.

310

I.R.C. § 402(h) (2003). SEPs are viewed as defined contribution plans.

311

I.R.C. § 3401(a)(12) (2003).

312

I.R.C. §§ 3121(a)(5), 3306(b)(5) (2003).

313

26 U.S.C. § 403 (2003).

314

HOWARD P. LANSER, JOHN A. HALLORAN, & WILBUR G. LEWELLEN,
MANAGEMENT; AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 554 (2002).

FINANCIAL

315

See Bankrate.com available at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/green/mut/mm_basic1.asp
(last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
316

See BODIE ET AL., supra note 155, at 34. Withdrawals out of money market accounts are
limited to 6 monthly and out of those, only 3 are permitted to be made by check; See also
Bankrate.com available at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/green/mut/mm_basic1.asp (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
317

See id. at 34.

318

See id.
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treasury notes and bonds, mortgage securities and federal agency debt. 319 These
bonds range from less risky government bonds to high-risk junk bonds.320
Generally, government bonds provide a lower-risk investment than stocks with
the tradeoff of achieving a lower overall rate of return. 321 The interest income
provided by these bonds is usually consistent and steady. Additionally, bonds of
higher quality seem to be less volatile then many stocks. However, bonds, while
generally less risky, will result in a lower overall return than stocks.
C. Higher-Risk Investments
Investing in higher-risk investments usually establishes an increased return for
investors. When it comes to individually saving and investing for retirement, many
people may act illogically in that they are usually more risk-seeking.322
1. Stocks
Stocks are securities issued to the public that represent ownership in a
corporation.323 Unlike some low-risk investments, stocks are traded on a variety of
stock exchanges.324 Stocks generally have the capacity to earn more over time due to
their higher risk and higher rates of return.325 However, the risk-return continuum
holds true; while stocks may yield a higher return on one's investment than low-risk
investments, their volatility can also render a larger loss to an individual's
investment.326
2. Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are investment accounts that compile money from hundreds or
thousands of investors.327 One or several professional money managers supervise and
monitor the account or portfolio.328 Additionally, these money managers have the
discretion of choosing which stocks or bonds to buy or sell.329 What makes these

319

See id.
320

High
Yield
or
Junk
Bonds,
Mar.
8,
2003,
available
at
http://www.finpipe.com/bndjunk.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). “Junk” bonds are corporate
bonds that offer a higher rate of return but have a higher risk of default. Id.
321

See id.

322

See generally Louis Uchitelle, Economic View; Why It Takes Psychology to Make
People Save, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002 at 4. A University of Chicago economist, Richard H.
Thaler stated “[y]ou have to force savings and take the money away before people have it and
can't resist spending it.” Id.
323

See generally BODIE ET AL., supra note 155, at 70.

324

See id. These stock exchanges include national and local security exchanges. Id.

325

See Appendices E & F.

326

See id.

327

See BODIE ET AL., supra note 155, at 985.

328

Id. at 12.

329

See id. at 105.
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funds appealing is the large amount of diversification that can be achieved by
compiling people's money. These funds generally produce a lower investment risk
compared to stocks330 and therefore may be more appealing.
D. Financial Analysis
In order to fix the PBGC's deficit, there needs to be mandated allocation of
pension plans in a low-risk investment. The best solution would be to require the
employer to invest a portion of the pension funds into a FDIC insured IRA. Among
the benefits of allocating a portion of pension funds into a FDIC insured IRA is that
in case of an employer’s insolvency or a bank’s insolvency, this deposit will be
insured up to $100,000 per depositor.331 Although this form of investment may yield
a smaller return on investment than would stocks or high-risk bonds,332 it offers a
more secure retirement.
Additionally, an IRA is a good tool for pensions because it is catered to
retirement. These accounts offer the tax-shelter benefit that employers and
employees prefer, and they have standards in place to regulate the deposits and
withdrawals of such funds.333 These existing standards make the solution simple to
implement.
Under this proposed solution, the IRA-allocated portion of the private pension
would be guaranteed up to the amount of $100,000.334 This security to the employee
is achieved without the employer paying insurance premiums to the FDIC.335 This
allocation would shift the excessive burden of underfunded and unfunded pension
plans away from the PBGC and onto the FDIC. This solution will be beneficial to
employees in that they will have guaranteed pension plan assets for the portion
invested in FDIC insured IRAs up to $100,000 and have the PBGC insurance for the
remainder of the funds.336
The proposal is based on the illustration in Appendix E-Illustration of Pension
Allocation with Interest Benefits in Favor of Employer and Security of Funds in
Favor of Employee (“Appendix E”), which shows an allocation of retirement funds
over a 30-year period. First and foremost, this simulation takes into account interest
rates and insurance premiums; it does not take into account inflation. The solution
proposed in Appendix E is a mandatory allocation of 20 percent of an individual's
defined benefit pension funds, to be put into a low-risk FDIC insured IRA. This
spreadsheet further illustrates the allocation of defined benefit pension funds into
stocks and bonds of 60 percent and 20 percent respectfully.
330

See id.

331

See supra note 287.

332

See Appendices A, E & F. It is evident that stocks and bonds yield a higher interest rate
then do normal savings accounts, certificates of deposits and individual retirement accounts.
333

See supra note 287.

334

Id.

335

Most banks have not paid premiums to the FDIC since 1996 and since then 900 banks
have started. See FDIC 2000 Annual Report, supra note 289, at 2. See generally supra notes
286-289.
336

See generally supra notes 286-287.
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In comparing Appendix E and Appendix F-Employer Returns on Pension
Investment Without Allocation in Individual Retirement Account and Paying the
Premium to PBGC (“Appendix F”), the annual pension accrual for the plan
beneficiary remains constant, but the interest income for the employer varies
drastically. In Appendix E, applying the current applicable interest rates for stocks,
bonds and IRAs rendered the employee the designated pension accrual and enabled
the employer to earn interest income totaling $984.26 per plan participant. In
comparing this calculation to Appendix F, which experiments with four different
fund allocations not including an IRA and using the average rate of returns of stocks
and bonds from almost the past 130 years, the solution Appendix E provides renders
the employer more interest income.
Appendix G- Employer Returns on Pension Investment Without Allocation in
Individual Retirement Accounts and Paying the Premium to the PBGC-Using the
Rates Applied in Appendix E (“Appendix G”) illustrates the results when
implementing the current interest rates used in Appendix E in a format similar to the
one used in Appendix F. The compilation of the results of Appendix G shows that
the employer’s interest income increases without investing in FDIC insured IRAs.
While the employer may receive a larger interest income from the illustration in
Appendix G, the employee’s anticipated pension is at a much greater risk.
Mandating companies to invest a portion of retirement funds in low-risk
investment will increase or maintain a safe level of earnings for the employer in the
long-run. Additionally, this solution will help eliminate the possibility of employers
taking unreasonable investment risks at the cost of the employee.
VI. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
The proposed solution of mandating a portion of the pension assets to be invested
into a FDIC insured IRA provides extra insurance protection to employees and takes
the excessive financial burden of covering insolvent plans off of the PBGC.
Allocating pension funds this way resembles the balance in burdens that employers,
the PBGC, and the FDIC will share in providing secure retirement funds to retirees.
If this solution can operate effectively and efficiently in today’s post-9/11 economy,
then there is no doubt that this solution can operate in a prosperous economy.
A. Stakeholder Analysis of the Proposed Solution
1. Effect on the PBGC
If employers continue to have underfunded or unfunded pension plans, the PBGC
will run the risk of going bankrupt and will not be able to insure any defined benefit
pension plans. If Congress passes legislation that mandates plan sponsors to allocate
a portion of plan assets into an IRA, there will be a guaranteed benefit of that portion
to go to plan participants in case of insolvency. Additionally, this will provide a
portion of funds that the PBGC will not have to insure since the FDIC will insure
that portion. This shift of the insurance burden will allow the PBGC to use current
premiums to pay for its current deficit.
2. Effect on the FDIC
If the solution is put into effect, the FDIC will not be burdened with any new
regulations and standards. The only change that will occur is an increase in bank
deposits, which will increase the amounts banks pay to the FDIC to maintain their
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relative reserve ratio. This effect is not detrimental to the operations of the FDIC.
Instead, the past success of the FDIC in insuring bank deposits makes this solution
even more realistic.
3. Effect on Banks
Banks would not be burdened by this proposed solution. This solution would
permit banks to operate in the same manner as they currently do. With the increased
amount of investment in bank IRAs, banks will be benefited by an increase in the
amount of money available for loans. In making loans, banks will charge the
borrower a higher interest rate than what it pays to investors.337 Therefore, banks will
actually profit from this solution.
4. Effect on Employees and Retirees
Due to the large number of underfunded and unfunded plans, employees are
losing out on those private pension plans that their employers promised. Instead of
receiving a flat rate back from the PBGC,338 employees will be eligible to receive a
larger amount of their promised pensions in the event of an employer’s insolvency
due to the insurance provided by the FDIC for the portion of the pension invested in
the IRA. Overall, this plan increases the amount of money that the employee or
retiree can recover from insurance companies in the case of employer insolvency. In
turn, this solution will aid the availability of the employee’s pension income during
retirement, helping to protect the employee from effects such as an increase in costof-living expenses, increased health care costs, and increased life expectancy.
5. Effect on Employers
It is an inevitable effect that the proposed allocation will slightly increase the cost
to employers by a decrease in interest income earned by pension funds, and increase
the burden on allocating the funds. However, this solution is similar to a “safe
harbor” plan used by employers who sponsor defined contribution plans. A “safe
harbor” plan reduces an employer's liability for poor investments by offering its plan
participants broader investment options.339 The similarity is that by mandating a lowrisk allocation of pension funds, employees' pensions will be better insured,
decreasing the chance of employer liability. Additionally, the burden currently put on
employers to improve disclosures and information requirements is consistent with
ERISA340 and will also serve to decrease potential employer liability. Furthermore,
this solution will continue to provide employers with the tax incentive to participate
in defined benefit pensions.
337
See generally Scott Lenz, Note, The Symmetry of the Realization Requirement and Its
Application to the “Mortgage Swap” Cases, 9 VA. TAX REV. 359, 383 (1989).
338

See 11 U.S.C.S. § 507 (2002).

339

Jefferson, supra note 76, at 633; see also ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 404(c).

340

29 U.S.C. § 1104(c). This section provides:
(c) Control over assets by participant or beneficiary. (1) In the case of a pension plan
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deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and (B) no person who is

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

41

194

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:153

6. Effect on the Economy
The economy will be benefited by this proposal. An increased investment in lowrisk accounts will have a cyclical effect on the economy. First, an increase in savings
will increase the funds that banks will have to loan, which, in turn, will create a
lower demand to borrow money and will promote investment in capital (land,
buildings, machines, etc.) due to the excess of supply of money. 341 This excess
supply will drive interest rates down and will make it cheaper to borrow money and
invest in capital.342 This increase in borrowing will increase the interest rate of saving
money, which will increase the return on investment.343 People will both be able to
increase their retirement earnings and capital investment, and enable economic
growth as well.
B. Counter-Arguments to the Solution
1. It is Costly to Administer
Some may argue that this proposal would be costly to administer. However, since
IRAs are already in service, the only administrative cost would be to familiarize plan
managers and administers with the mandatory allocation. Additionally, the insurance
and governmental agencies already exist and are in place, which decreases the
expense of initiating new agencies to oversee this proposal. This proposal, in
utilizing existing agencies, provides a cost-effective solution to the issues associated
with maintaining pension plans and stabilizing the PBGC.
2. Insufficient Retirement Funds
The increase of individuals investing in the stock market creates a higher
expectation of larger retirement returns. Indeed, many investors may actually make
more money investing in funds with higher risks and interest rates that the stock
market provides; however, investors can also lose pension assets because of these
same risks and returns.
Therefore, in the spirit of diversification, investors may choose to invest a portion
of their assets for retirement in a low-risk investment in order to diversify the risk
and maintain a secure level of investments. Individuals rely on defined benefit plans
to give them reliable income during retirement, which affords an adequate standard
of living.
Although it is beneficial for the future of Americans to independently invest for
retirement, it is equally beneficial to be guaranteed a minimum income during
retirement. If an individual's entire retirement assets were invested in the stock
otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable…for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which
results from such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
Id.
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market and directly affected by the well being of the economy, it would only take a
short dramatic downfall across the board to decrease the individual’s pension funds
and financial status. Therefore, a sufficient combination of pension plans and
personal investing will optimize a person’s financial stability during retirement.
Some critics may argue that society should focus more on defined contribution
plans due to the larger potential to earn money. Although this statement is true with
regard to earning potential, there is a larger risk of losing a large portion of
retirement savings if investors allocate all of their retirement savings into stocks and
bonds. If the latter occurs, those people who have insufficient retirement savings will
look to the government for financial support through a variety of social programs. If
they were to do this, then the whole process of establishing adequate retirement
savings becomes cyclical. In actuality, the government supporting and paying
retirement benefits now will decrease the likelihood of it paying and supporting
retirees who have insufficient funds to maintain an adequate standard of living at
retirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Defined benefit plans provide participants with a safe and stable income during
retirement. Unfortunately, economic downfalls are causing pensioners to lose out on
their promised benefits. Currently the PBGC is the trustee of nearly 3,000 pension
plans, including some of the largest unfunded pension plans in the country.344 Most
of these underfunded pension plans are the result of insolvent employers 345 who
made empty promises of retirement funds to their employees.
In order to secure the future of defined benefit pension plans, Congress must act
now. Congress must preserve the PBGC and its future of providing insurance for
defined benefit plans. By mandating a portion of pension funds to be allocated into a
FDIC insured IRA, the PBGC will be relieved partially of its excessive burden to
insure unfunded and underfunded pension plans. Additionally, Americans can look
forward to retirement knowing that their pensions are more secure.
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